In this study, we investigate couples' division of household tasks by the age of the youngest child, comparing France, eastern Germany, and western Germany. For our analyses, we draw on Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) data. As expected, our findings are that the division of housework is less egalitarian for couples with preschool age children than for childless couples, and these differences are greatest in western Germany. However, we had also expected the division of housework to be more egalitarian again for couples with older children, among whom maternal employment rates are higher than among those with younger children. Our findings confirmed this expectation for western Germany. Surprisingly though, we found that in both eastern Germany and France, the division of housework was actually continuously less egalitarian the older couples' children. An explanation may be that the traditionalizing impact of parenthood unfolds slowly with parenthood duration as couples increasingly yield to societal expectations regarding parental roles. In western Germany, where women reduce their employment most significantly when becoming mothers, employment status effects appear to dominate any other trends associated with the age of the youngest child.
Neyer, Gerda and Lappegård, Trude and Vignoli, Daniele
Does gender equality matter for fertility? Demographic findings to this question are rather inconclusive. We argue that gender equality is a complex issue that needs to be conceptualized in a way which includes gender equity and allows for gender differences but uncovers gender inequalities. We explore this approach by investigating the impact of four dimensions of gender equality on women´s and men´s childbearing intentions in Europe: the possibility to maintain a household, the capabilities to choose, the resources to have agency, and gender equity in household work and in care. We apply logistic regressions to data of the Generations and Gender Survey. Our results suggest that gender equality and fertility intentions are intertwined in a multi-faceted way, and that gender equality in the areas which we examine exert different impacts on women’s and men’s childbearing intentions. Our study also confirms that parenthood still constitutes a dividing line between more and less gender equality, and that this affects childbearing intentions of childless women and childless men differently than that of mothers and fathers. This necessitates an approach which allows identifying the essential gender inequalities in employment, in society, and in the family which matter for childbearing decisions.
Childlessness, especially voluntary childlessness, is low in France. Using data from the French version of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), this paper will focus on French reproductive norms. Among new generations the idea to have no child is supposed to be growing, but regarding to several indicators, this doesn’t seem to be so much verified, neither in the reproductive behaviors nor in representations: 12% of women remain childless, around 95% of men and women declare they want at least one child, and around 10% of men and women declare it’s not necessary to have children to be “satisfied” in life. After describing the background of childlessness, we analyze the characteristics of people who support this point of view, which is a minority position, regarding to social norms. Do they belong to specific socio economic status? Do they have other specific attitudes or behaviours? Do they personally have children or not? We will pay special attention to gender differences, comparing opinions and behaviours of men and women regarding to voluntary childlessness.
France and Italy lie at the two extremes as regards fertility levels in Europe. Although previous findings showed that desired fertility is very similar in France and Italy, an examination of intentions to have a child in the following three years points to a country-specific difference. Namely, in France reproductive intentions are higher than in Italy for all parities. Moreover, since the actual fertility levels are so different, there could be some sorts of constraints that limit fertility more strongly in Italy than in France. Taking advantage of the first two rounds of the French and Italian Gender and Generation Surveys, in this paper we aim at highlighting the profiles of those couples who do not realize their intended fertility projects in the two countries considered. This line of reasoning may provide important input to policy makers wishing to lift the constraints to fertility realization.
Fertility behaviours vary widely within Europe. France, Germany and Italy represent three tendencies concerning childbearing: in France a high fertility level although a postponement of first conception, with a two-children ideal family size; in Germany a very low fertility level linked to a polarization of fertility behaviours (zero or two children); in Italy a low fertility level due to the very late entry into adulthood, and frequent one-child families. The delay of fertility timing may constrain the childbearing strategies since unfecundability sharply increase in female age. In France, women in second unions accelerate childbearing in order to have children before they become sterile. Do we observe the same phenomenon for all the people who form a first union late? Do people accelerate their childbearing as soon as they reach later ages? We expect country specific impact of sterility given their different first birth timing and social norms.
This paper observes the change since the 1970s in the proportion of men and women having only one child during their reproductive life, and examines their sociodemographic characteristics. The aim is to explore the significant variables of the complement of the parity progression ratio from first to second birth (1-A1). First, we present the theories, findings and results relating to the single-child family model in Europe. Then, we perform a multivariate analysis with the dependent variable of the model being the fact of not having had a second child ten years after the birth of a first child in stable unions.
Who does not desire two children? A France-Italy comparison - In the industrialized word, France and Italy placed at the extremes as far as fertility behaviour is concerned. Besides these differences, in this work we also wonder whether (or not) fertility desires are different between the two countries. In particular, we aim at scrutinizing the factors influencing the choice of the fertility pattern in France and Italy, paying special attention to the "single child model" and "large family model". Our findings highlight that the desired number of children in France is only slightly higher than in Italy. Moreover, also women who do not desire a two-child family are very similar in the two countries.
Lefèvre, C. and Prokofieva, L. and Korchaguina, I. and Stankuniene, V. and Gedvilaite, M. and Badurashvili, I. and Sirbiladze, M.
Cette étude comparative de la France, la Géorgie, la Lituanie et la Russie explore un des champs des enquêtes GGS ayant trait aux valeurs. Elle s'applique à identifier les opinions au sujet de la solidarité intergénérationnnelle et leurs différences dans ces quatre pays. Deux dimensions sont plus particulièrement analysées. La première porte sur la conception qu'ont les répondants de l'implication relative de la famille et de la société dans l'aide aux plus jeunes et aux générations âgées. La seconde renvoie à la nature et aux modalités que peut prendre la solidarité familiale. Doit-il s'agir d'aides en nature ou en espèces ? Comment l'aide familiale intergénérationnelle est-elle perçue et quelle place occupe-t-elle dans les histoires de vie individuelles ? Est-il légitime que de telles aides modifient les parcours résidentiels et professionnels des hommes et des femmes ? Le présent article offre une réflexion méthodologique sur l'appréhension des opinions à partir d'enquêtes quantitatives et sur la pertinence en sciences sociales d'études comparatives entre pays. Il propose également d'étudier la solidarité entre générations en tant que révélateur des structures familiales et des contextes économiques et culturels des quatre pays.
Le lien entre valeurs et comportements démographiques est ici présenté dans le contexte de la grand-parentalité en France. De par leur statut, les grands-parents font, sans contredit, figure de « séniors » expérimentés dans le domaine de la famille, pour avoir vécu à la fois des transitions conjugales et familiales. Leurs valeurs familiales pourraient-elles être plus affirmées du fait de ce statut particulier? L'étude suivante propose d'examiner ces valeurs auprès d'individus nés entre 1926 et 1965, au regard de leur histoire conjugale et familiale, en distinguant les grands-pères des grand-mères appartenant à différentes générations, puis en comparant les valeurs familiales des grands-parents par rapport aux parents sans petit-enfant et aux répondants sans enfant ni petit-enfant, nés au cours des mêmes générations. En premier lieu, toutes les générations de grands-parents ne se ressemblent pas du point de vue des valeurs perçues, surtout les plus jeunes, davantage marquées par la libéralisation des mœurs dès la fin des années 1960. Les jeunes grand-mères se démarquent quelque peu des jeunes grands-pères quant aux solidarités familiales et à l'importance d'avoir des enfants. Par ailleurs, les grands-parents présentent des valeurs familiales un peu plus marquées que les répondants qui n'ont pas de petits-enfants, surtout s'ils sont nés entre 1946 et 1966. Les grands-parents reconnaissent ainsi davantage l'importance d'avoir des enfants que les parents sans petit-enfant et se montrent plus favorables à aider leur enfants adultes.